Public acceptability is one of the main barriers to the implementation of carbon taxes. Qualitative evidence based on a sample of individuals interviewed in Geneva, Switzerland, shows that the general public would not tackle climate change as economists suggest. The gap concerns not only the choice of climate policy's instruments (i.e. pull versus push measures), but also its specific design in the case of carbon taxes. In this respect, the gap is driven by a diffused perception of environmental ineffectiveness of carbon taxes, which goes hand in hand with distrust in the government and a strong demand for earmarking carbon tax revenues for environmental purposes. Our empirical findings are consistent with the recent literature on the public's preferences on environmental policy design and provide new evidence for the need to reconsider the conventional approach to economic instruments and environmental tax reforms. Reducing resistance to the implementation of Pigouvian taxes cannot abstract from providing effective responses to the concerns emphasized by the general public.
Introduction
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues of this century. International negotiations aim at stabilizing emissions at a level preventing severe changes in the climate system. However, they have generally failed to provide consistent and ambitious agreements. Unilateral initiatives have emerged in most developed countries, but the choice of instruments can be questioned from an economic perspective (cf. IPCC 2014; World Bank 2014) . Following the IPCC (2014), we classify climate policy instruments in five categories. The first category encompasses the market-based approach, i.e. economic instruments such as taxes and emissions trading systems. In a pure theoretical world, carbon pricing would represent the first best policy (cf. Baumol and Oates, 1971) . The second category refers to regulatory approaches (i.e. standards), which are still much diffused instruments of environmental policy, even though theoretically inferior to economic instruments. The remaining categories are represented by information policy (e.g. labels), public provision of goods and services (e.g. public transportation) and voluntary actions and agreements.
The evidence suggests that unilateral initiatives have often lacked to implement powerful instruments able to dramatically curb emissions, such as carbon taxes. When implemented, large exemptions hampered their effectiveness (Lin and Li, 2011; Baranzini and Carattini, 2014) . In many other instances, governments preferred second-best policies such as subsidies for renewables and energy-saving measures, eventually leading to relatively high implicit carbon prices (see e.g. OECD 2013; Marcantonini and Ellerman 2014) . The explanations of this pattern rely on the political economy of climate change mitigation.
We address this issue from a perspective of public acceptability. We follow a qualitative approach based on face-to-face interviews and ask to members of the general public what measures are necessary to reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, what is the role of the public sector and the place for carbon taxes as a policy instrument. We carry out our interviews in Geneva, Switzerland. As other European countries, just after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, Switzerland attempted to implement an ambitious mitigation strategy relying on energy taxes. However, in 2000 three energy-tax proposals were rejected by the population in a public ballot (cf. Thalmann, 2004) . Since then, Switzerland's climate policy, whose cornerstone is the 2001 CO 2 Act, relies mainly on a mix of policy instruments, including regulations, voluntary agreements (cf. Baranzini et al., 2004) and, by 2008, a carbon tax on heating fuels. The 2013 revision of the CO 2 Act increased the CO 2 tax rate and introduced several regulations, e.g. on imported cars. Political-economy aspects played a crucial role in shaping this path.
Our qualitative evidence suggests that the path followed by Switzerland and other similar countries is in line with the social perception of its population. This paper thus complements the recent literature on the public acceptability of mitigation policies (cf. e.g. Thalmann, 2004; Dresner et al., 2006a; Kallbekken and Saelen, 2011; Saelen and Kallbekken, 2011; Cherry et al., 2012 ; see also our companion paper Carattini and Baranzini, 2014) . The remainder of the paper is as follows: section 2 reviews the methodology, section 3 introduces the qualitative results, section 4 discusses them and draw policy implications, section 5 concludes.
Methodology
This qualitative study is based on a pre-tested semi-structured questionnaire with five face- The design of the questionnaire relies on a series of classroom discussions and focus groups, organised prior to the qualitative survey. Participants involved were either "standard" undergraduate or part-time employed students. This first step provides a first sense of how big may be the gap between economists and the public on climate policy and contributes to structure the questionnaire. In particular, students tended to ignore the incentive effect of carbon taxes, despite having seen the concepts of price elasticity and externality in introductory microeconomics courses.
As shown by Table A .1, the sample of respondents is relatively heterogeneous. The sample is composed of individuals of all income classes and includes most age categories. Different job profiles are represented and a large majority of respondents are tenants, in line with the Swiss real-estate context. Though, given the small size typical of qualitative studies, there is no pretention of being representative of the underlying population. The interviews were analysed with RQDA software (Huang, 2012) , a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software.
Results
The questionnaire starts with a very general question on how to reduce energy consumption (for households and businesses). We observe a certain degree of consensus across individuals, as most answers suggest voluntary measures such as energy-saving tips (cf. We emphasize that only in a few cases the public sector is taken into consideration. According to a few respondents, the government could give incentives to households and firms or apply directly some of the aforementioned tips to its own operations. Incentives are suggested under the form of subsidies (e.g. to public transportation) or energy taxes. Altogether, this may suggest that for the large majority of our interviewees the public sector should not take an active role to curb energy consumption in Switzerland. That is, emission abatements should mainly rely on private efforts. Since following our classroom discussions we were expecting this type of outcome, question 2 asks how to encourage energy consumption abatement, introducing explicitly the public sector.
As reported in Table 2 , the government has a role to play according to the majority of respondents, but this is confined to awareness-raising and persuasion. This figure is consistent with answers to question 1. Indeed, respondents contend that the responsibility of the public sector is to stimulate voluntary efforts to reduce energy consumption, such as the ones discussed above. Hence, it seems that most respondents would like to see the public sector getting involved in promoting cooperation among individuals so to reduce energy consumption and contribute to climate change mitigation. taxes, especially by those that did not consider the public sector in question 1. That is, only a very small minority thinks spontaneously of carbon taxes as a potential mean to tackle energy consumption and emissions. Those answers are to some extent coherent. They show that people are willing to undertake measures to reduce energy consumption either if these do not imply any cost or, if they do, provided that financial compensation (e.g. subsidies) is offered. From a political perspective, answers to this question seem backing up the choice done by many European governments to give priority to subsidies to e.g. energy-efficiency investments and renewable energy. The lack of support for carbon taxes comes as no surprise and analysing its determinants is one of the aims of this study. Question 3 thus explicitly proposes carbon taxes as a policy instrument and asks for the respondent's opinion on it.
Measures
We observe an important amount of discussion around this question. We cluster respondent's answers based on the following themes: perceived environmental effectiveness, trust in the government and distributional effects. Concerning perceived effectiveness, an important proportion of respondents raises serious doubts about the tax effectiveness. For them the tax would hardly reduce energy consumption: The recurrence of the argument about the tax environmental (in-)effectiveness seems pointing to a widespread underestimation of carbon taxes. On top of that, we note that a few individuals claim that with a carbon tax they would face a motivational crowding-out, i.e. the tax would decrease their efforts to reduce energy consumption. Conceptually, this effect can be defined as the consequence of a behavioural reversal that intervenes when agents feel to be treated unfairly with respect to a moral decision between a "good" and a "bad" action. That is, the introduction of an instrument such as a tax would imply that "no behaviour is good enough not to be penalized" (Goeschl and Perino, 2012) . With the words of Frey and Jegen (2001) , the policy instrument either modifies the agent's preferences or the perception of her duty, her environment or herself. Albeit not referring to a potential crowding-out, another respondent underlines the unfairness (as she perceives it) of carbon taxation:
Respondent says that it is not normal that the good citizen is not thanked for her efforts.
And that she has to pay for bad citizens. A control of bad consumers should be established so to tax them further. [KH2, female, 29] Twelve respondents express a lack of confidence in the government and policymakers. Some explicitly mention distrust, while others raise worries about the use of tax revenues. For some, carbon taxes are only a pretext to raise new fiscal revenues. That is, a Pigouvian tax simply hiding a Ramsey tax. In several cases, respondents state a need for transparency in the use of revenues, which may condition their support to the policy: MG1, male, 25] Distrust in the government leads some individuals to ask for ex-ante earmarking already at this stage of the discussion:
She would like to make sure that her money is really going to renewable energy projects.
[ DM3, female, 30] 'Yes, if the tax contributes to the development of renewable energy. However, we will never be sure. . . ' [LRG3, female, 30] Respondents tend to identify earmarking with the financing of environmental investments and in particular the development of renewable energy. We explore this issue more in detail while analysing question 4.
Distributional issues seem to be a concern for about half of the sample. Some respondents are simply worried about how the tax would hit the poorest households. Others propose possible solutions to overcome the regressive impact of carbon taxes (cf. Baranzini et al., 2000) .
'Those with money will keep consuming. At the end of the day, we always hit those DM3, female, 30] 'It is important not to penalize the poorest people.' [NB1, male, 80] 'The situation is already sufficiently difficult with respect to the current economic crisis.
Paying an additional tax seems to me a bad idea, above all in time of crisis.' [SB4, female, 46] 'On the one hand, it would force people to get involved, but on the other it would be unfair for people who already face financial problems. However, applying a tax based on the situation of each household would be acceptable.' [NB4, male, 23] 'This tax should be proportional to income and consumption. ' [MG2, male, 31] Question 4 provides respondents with the possibility to define their preferred way of revenue recycling, i.e. how they would use the revenues from this hypothetical carbon tax. Although it is an open question and thus respondents can mention any kind of revenue recycling, we suggest three options:
1) Funding of environmental projects.
2) Redistribution to most affected households.
3) Tax rebates for households and firms.
Some respondents weigh all options and introduce new ones (e.g. development aid, education), but most of our sample focuses directly on the funding of environmental project. For them, there has to be a natural and logical link between the tax purpose and the use of revenues. A few individuals really struggle to conceive how revenues could be used for other purposes than the environment. The second recycling option targets the tax's distributional effects by redistributing income to the most disadvantaged households. Its reception is relatively lukewarm. Only few people particularly concerned by distributional effects believe that social cushioning is necessary:
'First of all, it is about benefiting the least-advantaged people.' [NB1, male, 80] 'Above all, it is necessary to help retired individuals that need to be kept warm. ' [TDS3, female, 53] Other respondents share the concern about the regressive impact of carbon taxes, but do not consider social cushioning as a viable option, due to its presumably large administrative burden. They thus seem to accept that carbon taxes would make some households relatively worse off:
'To me, it seems too complicated.' [JRC1, male, 26] 'Really too complex and hard to realize.' [SB4, female, 46] 'Such system should not cost more than it yields.' [NB1, male, 80] These two types of answers represent however a minority. As discussed, for most respondents not using tax revenues for environmental purposes sounds inconceivable and groundless:
'So, we go nowhere! If we pay more and give back part to others, the money goes nowhere! The target would be to invest for the future. Mixed opinions are reported on the recycling option consisting in tax rebates for households and firms. The support it receives arguably results from the perceived necessity to introduce a system of bonuses rewarding those curbing their energy demand, rather than from the quest of a double dividend (except for respondent JRC1). This may explain the popularity of bonusmalus policies and is clearly in line with the most recurrent critiques from the general public to the Environmental Tax Reform (ETR, see below).
'Taxing is about making individuals aware of how dear is energy. This is to me the government's role, it could push it through the population by decreasing another tax.' [JRC1, male, 26] 'Using it as a bonus to reduce taxes to households and firms deserving it. ' [MG3, male, 60] 'Households and firms that did an effort would deserve a tax rebate. ' [KH2, female, 29] 'These revenues could actually allow to reduce taxes to those firms that get involved.' [MG1, male, 25] For those that do not like this option the explanation may reside once again in the missing link between taxation and the use of revenues, i.e. why taxing here and giving back there. A compelling interpretation is that for respondents NB2 and NB4, carbon pricing should not only redirect consumption towards cleaner goods and services, but also reduce the overall level of consumption, eventually leading to some degrowth.
'Tax rebates do not make any sense. At the end, people could consume what they saved.' [NB4, male, 23] 'This would increase the purchasing power of households and the solution is actually reducing household's consumption. ' [NB2, male, 23] 
Discussion and policy implications
Our qualitative evidence tends to confirm prior findings in the literature. We observe a general resistance to public intervention (as in Cherry et al., 2012) with, if deemed necessary, a preference for pull (e.g. subsidies to public transportation) over push (e.g. carbon tax) measures. For most respondents, private efforts represent the main approach to climate change mitigation and their effectiveness can be improved by the public sector through increased information and communication. Most of these efforts may come at a limited (or even negative) cost. The literature refers to "efficiency behaviour", which implies that with little effort the current level of comfort can be generally maintained, but at a lower level of energy consumption. Efficiency behaviour is opposed to "curtailment behaviour", which implies a change in lifestyle. Curtailment actions (such as the implementation of carbon taxes) are therefore much less popular than those targeting efficiency behaviour (Steg et al., 2006) . Indeed, our analysis shows that a large cloud darkens the sky of carbon taxes: perception of environmental ineffectiveness and distrust in the government's real purpose are in our view two sides of the same coin. It follows that respondents are generally disconcerted about the possibility of using the revenues of an environmental tax for something unrelated to the environment (i.e. "issue-linkage", cf. Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010 ; but also e.g. Beuermann and Santarius, 2006; Steg et al., 2006; Brannlund and Persson, 2012) . In this sense, it is because the carbon tax is perceived as ineffective that fiscal revenues have to be used in the environmental domain, otherwise the government would be simply seen as collecting extra revenues. Indeed, no other forms of recycling receive a tangible support. Not even social cushioning: although some respondents acknowledge the need to offset the tax's distributional effects, it seems that the way of financing social cushioning should make abstraction of carbon tax revenues (as in Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010) .
Hence, we observe a gap between what economic theory suggests both in terms of policy choice, i.e. first-best versus second-best policies, and policy design, i.e. efficient use of revenues (e.g. allocation to the general budget ensuring flexibility and thus funding of policies with the highest social return or direct reduction of distortionary taxes) versus earmarking for environmental purposes (cf. Kallbekken and Aasen, 2010) . We put forward several complementary explanations to this gap.
First, people may interpret the lack of private efforts as the result of a lack of information, whereas for economists analyse it is simply the standard outcome of a prisoner's dilemma. The call of respondents for improved communication may however somehow meet the recent strand of research on (conditional) cooperation in global dilemmas, see e.g. Cialdini (2003) Second, while for economists, in the short run and under standard assumptions, subsidies and taxes are equivalent in terms of incentives, the former are clearly preferred by the public. This preference is very well documented in the literature. As remarked by Steg et al. (2006) , pull measures are perceived as more acceptable and more effective than push measures, unless revenues are allocated for environmental purposes (cf. also Kallbekken and Aasen 2010) . Noncoercive instruments that make pro-environmental behaviour less costly are more appealing and considered as more effective as they are really perceived as an incentive, whereas taxes are seen more as a disincentive (or punishment), which unsuccessfully try to change people's lifestyle (cf. Steg et al., 2006) . That is, as stressed in Carattini and Baranzini (2014) , perceived effectiveness and acceptability go hand in hand. The same seems to apply to our findings. Indeed, our results point to a diffused underestimation of carbon taxes environmental effectiveness. Respondents do not expect carbon taxes to be effective and this does not seem to be related to the panoply of exceptions and exemptions of existing carbon taxes, but rather to either a misunderstanding of carbon taxes' incentive effect or to a perception of fully inelastic demand of fossil fuels 2 . Therefore, it comes as no surprise that people confound Pigouvian with Ramsey taxes (cf. Brannlund and Persson, 2012) and ask for earmarking revenues for environmental purposes. How could they have any environmental effect otherwise? That is, absent any earmarking, carbon taxes are perceived as a mere pretext to increase fiscal revenues. It is striking to see that this finding reconciles with those of studies focusing on the ETRs, which are generally fiscally neutral. Hence, perceived ineffectiveness and distrust in the government do not create the best premises for the implementation of carbon (or energy) taxes and above all of more elaborated schemes such as the ETRs (cf. Beuermann and Santarius 2006; Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006; Dresner et al. 2006a; Dresner et al. 2006b; Klok et al. 2006) . Earmarking for environmental purposes is shown to substantially increase acceptability of carbon taxes also in , and Carattini and Baranzini (2014) .
From this discussion three policy implications follow. First, when designing climate policies, policymakers may want to consider to give up some of the potential efficiency gains and trade them for increased clarity and thus acceptability. This would imply to earmark a substantial part of the revenues for environmental purposes, thus renouncing to e.g. some reduction in distortionary taxes, which economists tend to consider as the most productive use of revenues. This makes sense, since the general public do not fully understand the rationale for such an "obscure" mechanism. In this point we therefore agree with Grubb et al. (2014) : earmarking should no longer be a taboo for economists, at least as a short-term measure to channel political support towards first-best policies. As a result, the criterion of revenue neutrality would not be met. Again, from a political perspective this is no harm, since for the general public neutrality does not seem to be a necessary requirement to support carbon taxes. Though, one may argue that in the case of a real ballot lobbies would react differently depending on the way revenues are used. Yet, we argue that most lobbying usually come from energy-intensive industries which would lose anyway, if climate policy really aims at allocating resources more efficiently, regardless of the use of revenues.
Second, since people seem particularly sensitive to their own gains, it would be useful to design policies in a way that makes them salient for those that may enjoy them. Emphasizing financial gains may make revenue-neutral policies much more appealing to the general public, thus contributing to bridge the gap between it and economists. Policymakers may want to build on the example of bonus-malus policies. These policies enjoy a relatively large support, probably because they make more explicit which behaviour is profitable and which is punished (cf. e.g. Dresner et al. 2006b ). However, policies redistributing revenues lump sum act in the same way: small polluters are rewarded whereas big polluters end up with a net loss. The problem is that this mechanism is not made salient. The case of the Swiss carbon tax is particularly revealing. We emphasize the following two related elements. First, the population is not fully aware of the existing carbon tax on heating fuels (only 40% of the sample are aware of it in Carattini and Baranzini 2014) . Second, redistribution is not salient at all. Using figures for 2014, the amount redistributed lump-sum to Swiss residents is 52.50 Swiss francs (about 42€). To keep administrative costs low, this is done through the compulsory healthcare insurance. However, no particular explanation is given about this refund, which is introduced in small characters in the monthly healthcare bill (i.e. the full amount is divided by 12). Even though the Swiss CO 2 levy is not yet completely revenue neutral, up to one third of revenues being allocated to improvements in energy efficiency in buildings, this feature could be easily marketed as a tax threshold (cf. Pezzey and Jotzo 2013) and thus be associated to a right to pollute, which would equal the lump-sum transfer times the current tax rate. Furthermore, financial gains may come with benefits of environmental nature (cf. Carattini and Baranzini 2014) . In this respect, we stress emphasize the role played by the trial period in demonstrating the benefits of the Stockholm congestion charge and thus contribute to the policy success when people went to vote (cf. Kallbekken and Saelen 2011) .
Third, in a shorter horizon, policymakers may want to develop those policies promoting voluntary efforts, which clearly do not face issues of acceptability, and then from them move on to more stringent policies. Policies targeting voluntary efforts may not necessarily need to take place at the national level. Subnational and local actors, which likely enjoy more trust by communities, may be more effective in spurring cooperation (Catney et al. 2013; Tavoni 2013) . As shown by Blumer et al. (2014) for Switzerland, local utilities can have an important role to play in reducing energy consumption, provided that they are given the right incentives. In this respect it is of particular interest the choice of some utilities in several Swiss cantons to set the green electric mix as the default option. Even though users are in most cases given the possibility to opt out and move back to the "grey" option (thus saving a couple of cents per kWh), the evidence available so far indicates that only a few households take this chance while the large majority remains with the new default product. Arguably, such bottom-up approach would be more a complement than a substitute to top-down carbon pricing.
Conclusion
In the context of environmental issues in general and of climate change mitigation in particular, it is well known that the patient tends not to follow the doctor's prescriptions (cf. Hahn 1989; Brannlund and Persson 2012) . The main reasons behind the limited diffusion of firstbest policies seem to be related to their unpopularity. For most of the general public in this qualitative study, mitigation should mainly rely on voluntary efforts and public policy, if any, should be limited to encourage them through information, suasion and education. Market instruments such as subsidies or tax rebates may enjoy some degree of support, but carbon taxes do it only in a very limited extent. We assess qualitatively the drivers of this lack of public support and find them especially in the underestimation of carbon taxes environmental effectiveness. Perceived ineffectiveness goes hand in hand with distrust in the government, which is considered as looking for additional fiscal revenues only. In the case carbon taxes were to be implemented, since people do not understand or believe in their incentive effect, they would have to respond to a strong demand for earmarking fiscal revenues for environmental purposes. Indeed, most people believe that carbon taxes curb emissions only indirectly by generating revenues to be invested in the environmental realm.
In terms of climate policy, our analysis suggests that complex schemes may better leave the place for straightforward policies with tax revenues alimenting a visible green fund, albeit this implies renouncing to efficiency-enhancing redistribution and revenue neutrality. Second, the public should be given the time to experience or the information to evaluate policy's benefits. Third, policies promoting private efforts may be easily implemented (and appreciated) as they would not face the barriers that carbon taxes do. Such policies may however not be sufficient for high abatement targets and their cost-effectiveness has to be ensured. 
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